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and further extends the time that the distributees are kept from possession
and enjoyment of their property.
The goal of probate procedures should be to assist rather than to impede
the transfer of property from the dead to the living.32 The Smith decision,
however, conflicts with this basic social policy. It creates a "probate deep
freeze" by tying up estate assets for extended periods of time, while the
courts' "archaic probate machinery" cranks through its process. 33 Significantly, the decision comes at a time when progressive jurisdictions throughout
the country are striving to reduce the workload of courts and make probate
procedures simpler and less expensive.
ROBERT

A.

SMITH, JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: MERE MEMBERSHIP IN A SUBVERSIVE
ORGANIZATION WILL NOT PRECLUDE DEFENSE
FACILITY EMPLOYMENT
United States v. Robel, 88 S.Ct. 419 (1967)
Appellee had been employed as a machinist by the Todd Shipyard Corporation for ten years before it was designated a "defense facility" by the
Secretary of Defense in August 1962. As a member of the Communist Party,
he was charged with violating section 5 (a) (1) (D) of the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950. This statute provides that it is unlawful for any
member of an organization under final order to register as a Communistaction group with the Subversive Activities Control Board "to engage in any
employment in any defense facility."1 The federal district court dismissed the
indictment for failure to allege "active" membership and "specific intent"
to advance the organization's unlawful purposes. 2 On direct appeal, the
United States Supreme Court HELD, section 5 (a) (1) (D) is unconstitutional
because it bars defense facility employment solely through guilt by association
without a showing that the individual poses a threat to the national security.
32. SImEs, Introduction to SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE at 9 (1946); Wellman, Uniform
Probate Code, 12 L. QUADRANGLE NoTES 4 (1967).
33. Wellman, supra note 32, at 6.
1. 50 U.S.C. §784 (a) (1) (D) (1950).
2. United States v. Robel, 254 F. Supp. 291 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
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The Court has recognized that the right of association is a necessary consequence of the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly.3 The right exists without regard to whether the association seeks to
advance political, economic, religious, or cultural beliefs.4 Courts have been
reluctant to abridge freedom of association, with certain exceptions relating
to subversive organizations. Two rationales have been utilized to implement
this policy. First, the test that balances the particular governmental interest
in regulation of associational relationships with the individual freedoms of
the first amendment 5 will weigh in favor of the individual unless his association presents a "grave and immediate danger"6 or, more popularly, a "clear
and present danger." 7 Second, courts have frequently resorted to strict statutory construction to invalidate overly broad statutes. As stated in Shelton v.
Tucker:8 "[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 9
While protection of associational freedoms is predominant today, the
United States has never acknowledged a "fundamental right of subversive
association."1o In contrast to its watchful and inflexible attitude toward
legislation infringing on associational freedoms in other areas, the Court has
been very resourceful in upholding legislation involving membership in subversive organizations.-1 Scales v. United States12 is a classic example of this
resourcefulness. There the Court read into the Smith Act membership
clause13 requirements that "active" membership and "specific intent" to
advance the organization's unlawful purposes be shown before a conviction
could stand. The act itself was silent on these matters.34 The unifying
rationale for this and other major cases' 5 involving the conflict of first amendment freedoms with national security was simply that the national interest
as then interpreted was found paramount.
This history of tolerance toward legislation infringing on associational
rights of members of subversive organizations has recently been altered by
two related decisions, the present case being the most recent. The first case is

3. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543 (1963).
4. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).

5. Note, The Right of Association and Subversive Organizations:in Quest of a Concept,
I1 VL L.L. Rav. 771, 781 (1966).
6. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
7. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).

8. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
9. Id. at 488.
10. Rice, The ConstitutionalRight of Association, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 491, 503 (1966).

11. Note, The Right of Association and Subversive Organizations: in Quest of a Concept,
11 VmL. L. REv. 771, 789 (1966).
12. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
13. 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1948).
14. 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1948); 367 U.S. 203, 221-22 (1961).
15. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 US.
382 (1950).
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Aptheker v. Secretary of State,16 which declared unconstitutional section 6 of
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. This section disallowed use of
a passport by any Communist organization member having knowledge that
the organization was under a final order to register." The Court refused to
imply limitations on the act in order to save it from constitutional invalidity.
Because of the clarity and precision of the section, to do so would have
required substantial judicial rewriting, which would have perverted the
original legislative purpose.18 The flaw in section 6 was its application to all
Communists regardless of the threat posed to the Government by the individual Communist. The nature of the individual's membership in the organization was not considered. This arrangement is patently illogical in that persons were being denied their right to travel solely because of their associational
ties and without specific proof that they threatened the nation.
Because Aptheker could have been based solely on first amendment
grounds, it has been maintained that the decision may have pronounced a
new rule of "due process" under the fifth amendment. This rule would permit legislatures in dealing with a personal liberty under the fifth amendment
only that small amount of latitude allowed them in dealing with first amendment freedoms. This is distinctly less latitude than that allowed in legislation
19
If this
involving a deprivation of property under the fifth amendment.
hypothesis is correct, then in the present case the decision may have been
20
based on the fifth amendment right to hold specific private employment.
In fact it was not, but rather was based squarely on the concept of freedom of
association.
The instant case will now be examined in light of this new tendency to
extend more associational rights to subversive organizations through refusal
to inject constitutional limitations into otherwise overly broad legislation.
The flaw in section 5 (a) (1) (D) was its indiscriminate inclusion of all members of the Communist Party regardless of such considerations as "active"
membership or "specific intent," which were deemed so essential in Scales.
As in Aptheker, and for the same reasons, the majority was unwilling to read
these limitations into the section. Because of the lack of these limitations, the
section established guilt by association alone, without proof or evidence that
the individual's association posed the threat feared by the Government.
By reason of the inclusion of all types of association with Communist-action
groups without regard to the quality and nature of membership, section
5 (a) (1) (D) abridged rights guaranteed by the first amendment. The dissent
maintained that the majority merely disagreed with Congress and the Defense Department when it ruled that Robel does not present a danger to the
national security sufficient to require him to choose between his party mem16. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
17. 50 U.S.C. §785 (1950).
18. 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964).
19. Note, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 179, 195, 197 (1964).
20. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 352 (1955); Dent v. State of
West Va., 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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bership and his defense facility employment. 2 Although there was some infringement on associational freedoms by the section, the dissent felt this22was
easily outweighed by the real and substantial national interest involved.
The present case represents an inclination to extend more rights of
association to unpopular political organizations because the contrary Scales
rationale could have been used here had the court so chosen. Many fear that
the nation's defense plants will now be infiltrated with Communist saboteurs
who will greatly endanger the national security. Well aware of this possible
misunderstanding, the majority opinion cautioned that nothing in the decision should be taken to mean the Government could not, through narrowly
drawn legislation, keep from sensitive positions in defense facilities those who
23
would use their posts to impede the progress of the nation's production.
Already, the internal security subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee has made recommendations to fill the gap left by the instant decision.
In direct response to the ruling by the Court in this case, the committee
submitted a bill that would make it unlawful for an active member of an
ogranization ordered to register with the Subversive Activities Control Board
to be employed in a defense facility. To come within the act's scope, he must
also have "subscribed or assented to any unlawful objective of such organization." 24 It is probable that this new bill, if passed, would survive judicial
scrutiny as it contains the talismanic incantations of "active" membership and
"specific intent." It will be recalled that these same limitations were found
necessary in the Scales decision and were discussed in the instant case at the
lower court level. The Court has announced a policy that requires the Government to prove that the individual is a security risk regardless of, and apart
from, any association with a Communist-action organization. The proposed
legislation apparently meets this requirement.
TIm

21.

JOHNSON,

JR.

88 S. Ct. 419, 435 (1967).

22. Id. at 435-36.
23.
24.

Id. at 425.

S. 2988, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. §204 (B) (1968).
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